In this article, we call into question the assumptions that undergird conceptions of boundary, territory, community and ethno-cultural belonging in the constitution of European security. Both the term 'human security' as defined by development and human rights scholars and 'securitisation' as conceptualised by critical security studies concern the socio-psychological aspects of security. Yet, few attempts have been made to seriously discuss the psychological effects of securitisation on subjectivity and space. There is, as we will argue, a tendency in much literature to use concepts of 'existential security', 'fear', 'needs' and the 'politics of belonging' Á obviously connected to the human mind and individual emotionality Á without much space being devoted to the investigation of these concepts in terms of socio-psychological processes. We intend to fill this gap by discussing security and securitisation in terms of the psychology of subjectivity and space among young Muslims in Europe. Our principal argument is that through openness to the political psychology of subjectivity and space, and the (de)securitisation of both, we are able to develop more adequate maps of the European experience of danger and opportunity.
Introduction
The legacy of European colonialisms and nationalisms has conditioned immigration policies and citizenship/denizenship policies that inform European security regimes. In this article, we call into question the assumptions that undergird conceptions of boundary, territory, community and ethno-cultural belonging in the constitution of European security. Both the term 'human security' as defined by development and human rights scholars and 'securitisation' as conceptualised by critical security studies concern the socio-psychological aspects of security. Yet, few attempts have been made to seriously discuss the psychological effects of securitisation on subjectivity and space. There is, as we will argue, a tendency in much literature to use concepts of 'existential security', 'fear', 'needs' and the 'politics of belonging' Á obviously connected to the human mind and individual emotionality Á without much space being devoted to the investigation of these concepts in terms of sociopsychological processes. Our principal argument is that through openness to the political psychology of subjectivity and space, and the (de)securitisation of both, we are able to develop more adequate maps of the European experience of danger and opportunity. While we do not enter into detailed psychological analysis in this article, we explain how psychological techniques open the field of security analysis to levels of nuance and precision appropriate to the complexities of ethno-religious cleavage in contemporary Europe.
Securitisation is not only a process in which certain issues, like migration, are made into security threats, but it is also a psychological process in which subjectivity and space may be essentialised in response to structural and historical dynamics as well as in relation to external events. Securitisation, in this subjective sense, is a response to ontological insecurity and existential anxiety. Using the concept of ontological security, we are made aware of how subjectivity and space are connected and reinforced through place-making processes in which subjectivity becomes securitised. This is particularly important as we attempt to grasp how first and second generation immigrants (in our case Muslim diaspora and post-diaspora communities) in Europe are grappling with the effects of postcolonial legacies, dislocation, structural marginalisation and racism.
Grounded in critical political psychology and postcolonial analysis, our approach to security is decentred in terms of both scale and scope. In terms of scale, our understandings of security are grounded in studies of the lived experiences of Muslim minorities resident in certain European states. We seek to understand their political worlds, their senses of security and their orientation to certain locations Á their everyday and discursive heuristics that affect and condition political participation at home and abroad. In examining their psychological dispositions, we are not looking for abstracted and individualistic traits. Our psychology is grounded in an appreciation of the dominant impact of history and structure on the mind: How does a gastarbeiter or a maghreb construct political space? What places occupy the political discourse of a young British male whose grandparents were born in the Punjab? To what extent are members of majority and minority communities securitised in relation to each other, in relation to the space they occupy and in regards to their own self-conceptions?
Critical political psychology and postcolonial analysis complicate much work in the constructivist tradition of international relations, while at the same time providing an extended perspective to critical security studies and to analyses of human security. In terms of scope, we seek to render more complex those causal arrows that construct European states as entities to be secured against threats from beyond: European minorities and majorities may both experience threats from within and, when it comes to securitisation, the spatial imaginary of 'Europe and its distant Other' may be less relevant than alternative cognitive mappings. Policies developed to secure the state have unintended destabilising consequences and transnational diaspora communities, especially Muslim communities, are affected by and affect such policies. By developing more adequate maps of European security, we are able provide a much needed politicalÁpsychological perspective on debates related to space, security and diaspora politics.
Infusing critical and human security studies with insights from critical political psychology and postcolonial analysis, we are able to more adequately describe how a process of securitisation of Islam from within Muslim communities is occurring as socio-psychologically disillusioned and marginalised Muslims organise to challenge secular norms, democratic governance, and European mainstream organisations and institutions. However, there is also evidence of a desecuritisation of Islam as many diaspora Muslims become increasingly focused on adhering to democratic rules and norms in order to gain legitimate access to public space and to influence national and transnational policy-making procedures. The political psychology of engagement can thus counter the need to securitise space, community and subjectivity and can work as a counter-force to the current trend towards exclusive identifications.
The article consists of four sections. In the first, we define some key concepts and situate our arguments in the broader debate on International Relations theory, critical security studies, human security and securitisation. In the second part, we discuss how a socio-psychological perspective, a critical political psychology, can inform security studies and how this is related to the postcolonial trauma of Muslim migration to Europe. Here we establish the principal historical and structural elements of immigration, settlement and regimes of citizenship in Europe, especially northern Europe, with a closer analysis of the UK to exemplify the political psychology at work in a postcolonial context. Hence, although the article provides a number of European examples, the UK is used throughout as an example of a society in which the legacy of colonialism is still affecting inter-group relations. In the third section, we detail the political psychology of securitisation and how it shapes perceptions of space, place and self among Muslim minorities in particular. Then, in the fourth and final section, we illustrate the political consequences of such processes through an examination of Muslim political projects and public policy developments in Europe in general and in the UK in particular. We are predominantly concerned with diaspora politics and the securitisation of subjectivity and space in response to government policies, majority perceptions and global changes and how these shape political (sub)cultures and policy choices.
Approaching security and securitisation
European Security is often discussed in terms of various challenges, ranging from epidemics to demographics, to the environment and climate, migration, religion, organised crime and terrorism. Within International Relations theory, security is no longer predominantly related to threats arising from other states, but is often perceived in terms of threats within states or to the international society as such (see e.g. McSweeney 1999 , Weiss 2005 , Burke 2007 ). The MarxistÁStructuralist approaches of the 1960s, the interdependency school of the 1970s and in particular the postmodern, poststructural and postcolonial approaches of the 1980s and the 1990s have all challenged state-centric models and the idea of sovereignty, as competing global actors are defying traditional conceptions of state power. To this should be added the IR-constructivist approach headed by Wendt (1994 Wendt ( , 1999 and others (Adler 1997 , Checkel 2001 , who share many of the critical approaches to the realist conception of state power, but who predominantly continue to see states as the key referents in the study of international politics and international security (Smith 2000 , Baylis 2008 ).
There is a growing dissatisfaction among International Relations scholars with state-centric models of economy and society and, particularly, with the failure to capture the rapidly growing impact of non-state actors and the implications of technology in a global age (Weiss 2005) . Many of these developments suggest a move from focusing on abstract institutionalism and agentless structuralism towards the realm of the socio-psychological. In addition, critical security studies have increasingly emphasised the role of the individual, thus questioning fundamental state-centric assumptions about security practices (Buzan et al. 1998 , Booth 2004 , Manners 2006 ). Referring to critical security studies as a single field is, however, problematic as such studies encompass a number of approaches. Those taking their point of departure in Critical Theory, for instance, have often been careful to differentiate themselves from more postmodern and poststructural approaches to security (Cox 1996 , Booth 2004 . Despite sharing an emphasis on the subjective interpretation of facts and questioning the authority and legitimacy of existing institutions, these scholars have focused less on historical and discursive constructions of reality and more on linking security to the needs for individual emancipation from structured and systemic oppressions. Many poststructural/postmodern scholars on security are also concerned with finding ways in which to replace the realist state-centered security discourse with alternative interpretations of threats to 'national security'. While the focus of poststructural and postmodern accounts is located in discourses and consciousnesses, the state remains crucial for the construction of threat in most poststructuralist writings on security. Walker (1993) , Campbell (1998 ), Der Derian (2000 and Connolly (2002) share the perspective that internal security is produced through the state construction of external threats in which discourses of danger are circulated and acted upon.
In comparison, the focus on the individual, rather than the state, is more explicitly pronounced in the concept of human security which was the handiwork of a group of development economists, who conceptualised the UNDP's Human Development Report (Acharya 2008) . Human security, involving the promotion of freedom from fear and want through policies emphasising human protection, life and dignity, has become a prominent feature of current analysis and discussion (UN Human Development Report 1994, Kaldor 2001 , Manners 2006 . Central to the human security approach is the focus on the individual as the referent object and the linkage among security, human rights and socio-economic development as well as a concern for the global environment (Elner 2008) . The concept has become particularly relevant in a post-cold war era focused on human intervention and the 'responsibility to protect'. This involves the principle that the international community is justified in intervening in the internal affairs of states accused of gross violation of human rights.
The emphasis on human security is also central to the ways in which securitisation has been conceptualised beyond the borders of the nation-state involving various aspects of societal and existential security. Hence, Buzan et al. (1998 , also known as the Copenhagen School) define 'securitisation' as the process in which an issue once presented and accepted as an existential threat, prompts reactions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. To securitise an issue that has not previously been viewed in security terms is to challenge society to promote its value by committing greater resources to solving the related problems. To desecuritise an issue, in contrast, means removing it from the realm of the politics of existential survival, thus making it easier to resolve through cooperative means of problem solving (Sheehan 2005, p. 54) . In discussing security and threats as discursive actions with political consequences, the Copenhagen School builds upon Constructivist theories that see interests as the result of material, and especially immaterial, factors that are contextual rather than predefined. Within Europe, for instance, we have seen how Muslim and other minority communities are repeatedly framed in terms of security threats as migration is perceived as threatening to the self-identity of the majority society.
Whether drawn from the Copenhagen School, Critical Theory, poststructuralist models or from the discourse on human rights and development, a set of common concepts, notably 'emancipation', 'threat', 'human security' and 'securitisation', focus our attention on socio-psychological aspects of security. However, as Sheehan (2005) has noted, there is a tendency in much work on securitisation to treat societies and communities as homogenous entities or unitary actors, thus providing few incentives to seriously investigate the psychological underpinnings of security. As a result, few attempts have been made to discuss the political psychological effects of securitisation on subjectivity and space. This is not to say that group identity and group actions are unimportant or cannot be studied psychologically. However, collective identity must be understood as something more than the sum of the individuals who make up the collective.
The fact that identity is often constructed on the basis of cultural understandings of community, ethnicity, nationhood and religion (among others), as people integrate cultural characteristics into their social identities, does not mean that such cultural traits are in any way essential to human nature per se. A psychological perspective puts the emphasis on what goes into the story or narrative about the self, about ourselves and others. It means investigating the cognitive reasons why individuals experience ontological insecurity and existential anxiety as well as the emotional responses to these feelings. It is focused on the intersubjective ordering of relations that is how individuals define themselves in relation to others based on their structural basis of power (Huysmans 1998) . But in contrast with constructivist and/ or poststructural understandings of identity and security, it is also concerned with the inner life of human beings by seeing individuals as linked not only structurally, but also through their reasoning and perceptions, their scripts, schemas and heuristics as well as their emotional intersubjectivity, in which they continually receive and give emotional messages often unconsciously (Craib 1989 , 1994 , Vogler 2000 . The emphasis here is on how discursively constructed subject positions are taken up by concrete persons through both cognitive choice and fantasy identification/emotional 'investments' (see Hall 1993 , Barker 1999 . Hence, both social psychology and psychoanalysis can add important dimensions to contemporary understandings of why issues, as well as notions of self and others, become securitised. As noted by Vamik Volkan, among others (see Kristeva 1982 , Craib 1994 . . . the tools of psychology, and especially of psychoanalysis, can shed light on group identity and behavior, not because they concern our unconscious drives or parts of psychosexual development, but because of the tacit assumption that each individual or group has complex and idiosyncratic ways of dealing with the demands of the inner and outer worlds. (Volkan 1997, p. 20) Political psychological approaches to security: the search for ontological security How then can a political psychological perspective infuse critical security studies (broadly defined) and promote a more adequate understanding of the postcolonial trauma facing many Muslim communities in Europe? One way is to take seriously human security scholars' emphasis on the individual as the referent object of study as well as poststructuralist understandings of how discourses and narratives construct people's perceptions of security, insecurity and securitisation of self and others, and relate these to socio-psychological and psychoanalytical perspectives on how 'identifications of the ''inside'' link to the regulatory power of the discursive ''outside''' (Barker 1999, pp. 18Á19 ). Kristeva's (1982 Kristeva's ( , 1991 argument that self is intersubjectively constructed even in our imagination is here of relevance as it focuses on how fears and negative emotions are often projected onto another person or group, an abject, in order to reduce anxiety and increase ontological security. Here it should be noted that we do not perceive psychological approaches to security and identity as being disentangled from discursive and structural understandings. Rather we proceed from critical, discursive and psychoanalytical approaches that take cognitive work and emotional investments seriously, emphasising the psychological effects of experiencing identity loss (see e.g. Kristeva 1991 , Billig 1995 , Hall 1997 , Volkan 1997 , Reicher and Hopkins 2001 . Such a loss, in Franz Fanon's vivid language, can be understood as 'individuals without an anchor, without horizon, colourless, stateless, rootless Á a race of angels' (quoted in Hall 1993, p. 395) .
It is within this framework of ideas that Laing's (1960) and later Giddens' (1990 Giddens' ( , 1991 conceptions of ontological security and existential anxiety should be addressed. Critical of the inhumanity of late-modern societies, Laing writes of the range of threats to ontological security that arise from the often engulfing and impinging character of conventional social structures and of the coldness of alienated social relations that commodify and depersonalise individuals. His work affords vivid portrayals of the psychic consequences of alienation, cold bureaucratic indifference and commodification. According to Giddens' (1991) ontological security refers to a 'person's fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes a basic trust of other people [in order to] maintain a sense of psychological well-being and avoid existential anxiety' (Giddens 1991, pp. 38Á39 ). This is not so much a conscious cognitive awareness as it is an emotional disposition 'rooted in the unconscious' (Giddens 1990, p. 92 ). Giddens' conceptualisation builds upon Erikson (1950) , who views identity as an anxiety-controlling mechanism reinforcing a sense of trust, predictability and control in reaction to disruptive change by re-establishing a previous identity or formulating a new one (Kinnvall 2003 , Mitzen 2006 . A focus on ontological security and existential anxiety adds important perspectives to studies on security by emphasising how emotions and otherness are involved in the search for security at times of crisis. As Erikson argues, cultural, social and economic instability makes it difficult to balance identity and identity confusion with the result that intimacy becomes more difficult than separateness:
[i]dentity formation involves a continuous conflict with powerful negative identity elements: what we know or fear or are told we are but try not to be or see; and what we consequently see in exaggeration in others. In times of aggravated crises all this can arouse in man a murderous hate of all kind of 'otherness', in strangers and in himself. (Erikson 1968, p. 289) Although such insecurity and otherness can be constructed through state discourse, as recognised by poststructuralist scholars on security, they work at the individual level. This is particularly important as we attempt to understand the experience of many Muslims living in European diaspora communities. The search for ontological security becomes a spatial as well as a psychological dynamic to do with a generalised sense of danger and threat and the longing for a secure home. As Noble (2005, p. 107) has noted in regard to the post-9/11 world, the experience of increasing racism and 'otherness' undermine the ability of migrants to feel 'at home' and hence their capacity to exist as citizens. Home, in this sense, constitutes a spatial context in which daily routines of human existence are performed; it is a secure base on which identities are constructed (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998, p. 28) , while homelessness, in contrast, is characterised by impermanence and discontinuity. Lacking a sense of home, some community members feel the need to securitise subjectivity, which means an intensified search for one stable, often essentialised, identity (regardless of its actual existence), often in opposition to a vilified other.
Hence, for some minority communities homesteading operates as a bordering practice and becomes a way to return intimacy and security to their everyday life. It often involves place-making processes as parallel societies are constructed to delineate the community's boundaries through shop signs, restaurants, minority markers and other identity signifiers (Castles and Davidson 2000) . But it can also involve narratives of traditional life in a far-away place. In both forms, homesteading can respond to structural marginalisation and homelessness in the country of residence. The concept of homesteading is clearly linked to security Á psychologically as well as politically. In a political sense, homesteading in the host society may involve direct interactions with the former homeland. Such involvement is likely to affect political developments in both the homeland societies and in the host societies, as well as relations between the two. Diasporas may get actively involved in homeland politics through economic remittances, fund raising, the diffusion of ideas or through joining local groups or organisations in the homeland Á some of which may work as oppositional forces to current regimes. They may also make return visits to their former homeland in order to facilitate networks and social ties with other migrants in the host societies as well as providing links to the country of origin. It is often a way to maintain social visibility in both places (Vertovec 1999 , Duval 2004 , Brown 2006 .
The concept of home/return visits has gained prominence in the analyses of perceptual space and socio-psychological security and belonging, but the concept is also useful for broadening the discussion of security in a more political sense. Studies have shown how such visits inform policies and have political consequences at both national and transnational levels (Duval 2004 , Mueller 2006 , O'Flaherty et al. 2007 ). According to Duval (2004) , any conceptualisation of return visits requires a deeper understanding of how individuals position themselves within the context of two localities where one refers to their place of birth or the external homeland, while the other refers to their current city or country of residence. The space created within such positioning is what Brah (1996, p. 208 ) has termed 'diaspora space' or 'the intersections of diaspora, border, and dis/location as a point of confluence of economic, political, cultural, and psychic processes'.
The concept of home, or homeland, is not entirely unproblematic, however, especially if such notions are to include those born and brought up far away from such homelands Á South Asian post-diasporic Muslim youth, for instance. Returning to Pakistan, Bangladesh or India, these young people may share some notion of ethnicity, but may otherwise be foreign to the system, the norms of behavior and even to the language (Brown 2006) . For many of these young people, their country of residence (and often birth) is their homeland and most of them want economic integration and access to employment, housing and other social services. However, in the light of economic deprivation and discrimination, it is not surprising that some of these young people become increasingly interested in their identity as Muslims and even in the profound conflicts that have emerged in South Asia. Thus, diaspora should not be seen as homogeneous entities, but as diverse groups that pull in different directions within different contexts.
This focus on post-diasporas implies that 'longing for home' is not always related to geographical space, but can be equally interpreted as a search for ontological security in relation to the society in which many post-diaspora communities reside. Given the refusal of majorities in Europe to open the door to sincere and egalitarian regard of the newcomer and their inclusion as fully entitled and integrated members of the nation, minorities have been confronted with hostility, closure and inwardlooking nationalism. Being estranged and othered, many have at first practiced quiescence and retreat from the public space, keeping their heads down and hoping for the best Á if not for themselves, then for their children. Their children Á although not all of them Á have increasingly sought refuge in their own re-imagined parallel societies, invoking strands of ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious tradition in order to re-establish pride and a sense of home and belonging Á the securitisation of subjectivity. In response to this, certain strands of majoritarian political communities have been attracted to neo-nationalist projects that now ironically castigate the very communities that were in the first place rejected for their purported refusal to integrate. The enemy is no longer outside the nation, but threatens the nation-state from within Á the enemy is in the womb Á and is discursively constructed through nationalism, racism and xenophobia.
Muslims in Europe: postcolonial politics and the political psychology of securitisation Such discriminating features have taken a specific form in postcolonial Europe. With regard to theories of European security, postcolonial criticism entails the need to 'engender and decolonise IR theory in order to dismantle its Eurocentrism and cultural essentialism' (Bhabha 1990 , Keyman 1997 , p. 194, Spivak 1999 . A postcolonial approach, in addition to a political psychological perspective, is thus instructive in explaining changes in both diaspora and European majority politics in the 1990s and beyond, notably in light of the September 11 attacks, the July 7 London attacks and the Madrid bombing.
Historically, the European nation-states extended their reach through forms of internal and external colonialism. The reach of the British Empire was eroded and then broken through processes of decolonisation in Africa and Asia throughout the mid-twentieth century. In the wake of decolonisation and the partition of India, Indians and Pakistanis, many of them Muslims, immigrated into Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. Under the 1948 British Nationality Act, citizens of former colonies had rights of settlement and citizenship in the UK, and hundreds of thousands took advantage of the need for labour to settle in London and the industrial towns of the Midlands and the North. Under more restrictive immigration legislation, East African Asians supplemented the first waves of immigration throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1970s, significant numbers of Muslims have migrated from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan, some as refugees and asylum seekers.
As a former colonial power, in which an elite of white settlers in collaboration with comprador elements exercised considerable power over native populations, Britain constituted a place of settlement in which, notwithstanding their legal status as citizens, new commonwealth immigrants arrived with an already ascribed inferior status ('station') as displaced colonial subjects. Full and equal national integration was, therefore, an inherent contradiction. Not only were Muslim immigrants assigned to a lower ethnic station, but also their occupational categories upon arrival placed them predominantly in the working class. As a substantial diaspora, the South Asian population in the UK constituted from the start of a substantial group whose phenomenology of space and place problematised the ostensibly secure boundaries of the British nation.
What a postcolonial analysis shows is how differing experiences of empire and colonisation have conditioned different choices in multicultural policies and the establishment of a range of citizenship policies. Hence, British colonialisation saw itself as 'respectful of cultures', (or indifferent to them) while French colonialisation proclaimed itself 'assimilatory' (Balibar 1991) . In British multicultural politics, ethnic communities have become an important reference point for public authorities who have placed the policy emphasis on 'race and ethnic relations' (Melotti 1997 , Geddes 2003 , Modood 2005 , while in France integration has basically meant assimilation to French culture and nation, asking migrants to drop any particular form of cultural identity (Melotti 1997 , El Hamel 2002 , Kivisto 2002 . In Germany, yet another approach can be found as minorities have often been treated as guest workers with social rights rather than political rights (Samad and Sen 2007) . Despite these differences in institutional approaches, the results have been strikingly similar in socio-economic terms with Muslim minorities forming a significant under-class throughout European societies and with unemployment ranging from two-and-a-half times to five times the unemployment rate of the majority population (Pedziwiatr 2007 , see also Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2010a) .
Our research into Muslim minority and non-Muslim majority communities across European societies has revealed a complex of psychological and sociological responses towards the geopolitical shocks generated by 'clashes of fundamentalisms', wars, acts of terrorism, and the generalised atmosphere of risk, doubt, fear and insecurity (see Nesbitt-Larking 2010a, 2010b) . Many Muslims in the diaspora find that their religion assumes new significance and/or discover that its symbolic connotations have somehow shifted. This is largely due to their transition from majority to minority status where a heightened awareness of Islam is discovered anew (Mandaville 2001) . To be a young Muslim in many European societies of today requires a constant negotiation with the rest of the society of what it means to be a Muslim. The fact that Islam, in response to legacies of colonialisation, modernity, globalisation and discourses on terror, has become increasingly politicised and securitised has sharpened identity issues among many young Muslims. As young Muslims in Europe, they are under strong pressures to take a stand in the perceived conflict between various notions of European secularism and Islamic religion (Kepel 2004) . It is not only minority populations that experience perceptions of threat in a global era, but majorities are also affected by tendencies towards hostility, closure and inward-looking nationalism, and may seek refuge in their own ideas of what constitutes their culture, religion, identity and tradition. Moderate voices may find it difficult to get heard in this process as they often lack the simplified language of nationalist or radical demagogues.
Throughout European states, Muslims and Islam are thus becoming increasingly securitised. In the neo-nationalist discourse of right-wing politicians, Muslims are frequently characterised as invaders with alien cultures, worshipping other gods and threatening the majority community's ways of life. In the face of such political psychological perceptions, and in line with a discourse on terror, European governments have often opted for restrictions on migration and for particular measures of surveillance of Muslim communities. The UK control orders constitute one such example. These orders were introduced under the 2005 anti-terrorism legislation and were designed to restrict the movements of any kind of suspect, including British nationals. These orders impose severe restrictions on an individual's daily life and can be likened to house arrest without clear time limits. According to recent figures (2010), there are currently ten control orders in force and some 45 people have been subjected to the controls since the system was introduced (Casciani 2010) . Further examples include the ban on minarets in Switzerland in 2009 and the ban on religious symbols in French schools in 2004. Events surrounding these incidents illustrate the particular postcolonial legacies facing Muslim diaspora and post-diaspora populations in Switzerland and France. The hijab (headscarf) issue made laȋcité (secularism) a French exception different from the secularism prevalent in other western states. It became especially contentious after the Minister of Education, Bayrou, issued a circular forbidding the wearing of any ostentatious religious sign in public schools, suggesting that girls resisting the rule should face expulsion. This circular gave the power to the local schools to decide. It was also at the local level the government tried to encourage the establishment of sociocultural organisation that should counter the Islamic organisation active in certain areas of high Muslim presence. As argued by Kastoryano (2006, p. 59) , 'the headscarf issue brought into the open the tensions that existed between national institutions and immigrant Muslim populations and established a kind of power relationship between the ''law of the Republican state'' and the Qur'an, between a sort of ''society's law'' and the ''community's law'''. The fact that attention was focused on the hijab also points to the gendered dimension of postcolonial politics in a European context. Hence, majority populations can be said to have exhibited elements of moral panic and therefore essentialist securitisation of religion in their discourses and actions. The rediscovery and reassertion of nationalisms (verging on xenophobic hypernationalisms in some instances) and established religions represent bids to secure the polity against Islam as a religion and as a culture (Kinnavall and NesbittLarking 2010a). Of course, as we discuss below, there has been a range of political psychological responses among Muslim minorities too, ranging from uneasy retreatism, through attempted engagement, to attempts to construct and inhabit the global ummah. Both the facts of this range of responses and the challenges associated with either mapping or predicting such responses on a broad social level illustrate the distinctive importance of a political psychological approach towards Muslim identities and values.
Not all of the consequences of the action and reaction of ethno-racial politics in the postcolonial setting of Europe are obvious or straightforward, however. Postcolonial cultures problematise the ethno-racial landscape and call into question blunt stereotypes as well as invoke far-away issues. Some Hindus living in the UK, for instance, are paradoxically reproducing stereotypes common among European majority populations when they react against the label 'Asian' and reassert the threat of Muslims living in Europe. A speech repeated across UK campuses during 1994 and 1995, entitled 'Who the hell do you think you are' was quite explicit in this regard:
This term has also some serious repercussions for us. Let me just give you a few examples. Salman Rushdie, when he wrote the book Satanic Verses, the newspapers had headlines 'Asians call for Rushdie's head'. During the Gulf War, 'widespread support for Saddam', and, most recently in East London, 'Asian thugs murder white boy'. It was not my community that called for Rushdie's head. It was NOT my community that supported Saddam Hussain. And it wasn't Hindu youths that hacked to death that white boy in East London. If anything, if they can be called problems at all, they are clearly Muslim problems not Hindu problems. (Raj 2000, pp. 544Á545) The subtext of the speech is that Hindus are nothing like that. This view of Hinduness is part of a postcolonial understanding that portrays Hindus in the West as hard-working, law-abiding, family-oriented, morally upright and economically successful (Bhatt 2000) . These values are meant to increase the status of an explicit Hindu community in its dealings with the British state. These words also spell out how the HinduÁMuslim conflict in India now occurs in Europe as a postcolonial legacy, influenced by various forms of cultural survival in the light of multicultural policies and global discourses on fear and anxiety, notably the demonisation of Muslims. This emphasis on cultural survival brings to light the securitisation of subjectivity and space as the new homeland, in this case the UK, is being reconceptualised on the basis of postcolonial legacies in which the Muslim other is clearly defined. In response to such external categorisation, some Muslims respond in a similar manner, thus searching for transnational solutions to their victimisation and current sense of trauma. Here, the global ummah is likely to play an important spatial role as religion is portrayed as an all-embracing solution.
An early study by Modood et al. (2006) demonstrated, for instance, that almost all first-generation South Asians thought religious education and a religious lifestyle were important as opposed to 85 per cent of the second generation. The important exception was second-generation Muslim Asians. This finding is confirmed by a later study of post-diasporic adolescent Pakistanis who identify more with their religious identity than with their Asian identity (Modood 2005 , Robinson 2005 ). The option for psycho-social retreatism is ever-present and so too is that of engagement and attempted integration. But for increasing proportions of young Muslims, new imagined and transnational communities are of greater relevance. Muslim diasporas have become widely organised in transnational networks and associations, both in consumption and production of media, politics, religious activity, cultural artefacts, economic activity, fashion and food. As Samad and Sen (2007, p. 11) argue, 'The old diasporas of yesterday have become the transnational communities of today, and Muslims have strong networks both as ethnic and religious communities'. Hence, in response to racist politicians, migration controls, segregation and their parallel life existence, some Muslims in Europe have increasingly come to interpret the Eurocentric 'we' of far-right discourse as being about threats to their religious identity, at times insisting upon their own system of law, order, societal security and governance. Recent surveys of Muslim opinions in the UK, for instance, show that up to one third of the respondents claim to have more in common with Muslims in other countries than with non-Muslims in England (Mizra et al. 2007 ). However, Engbersen (2007) notes that such transnationalism is by no means inevitable and is in fact conditioned by the regime of citizenship and cultures of acceptance/rejection that is in place. His study of transnationalism in the Netherlands confirms that high degrees of social integration of Muslims result in strong ethnic identities and weak transnational influence, while unemployment and social exclusion lead to greater affiliation with transnational influences emanating from the country of origin and the worldwide community of Muslims. Muslims, especially young Muslims, are in fact more strongly represented among the unemployed throughout Europe (Pedziwiatr 2007) .
The young generation of European Muslims possesses not only formal citizenship, but also tacit knowledge which allows them to engage constructively in citizenship activities, seeking the recognition of their heritage and values in the public, private and transnational sphere (Pedziwiatr 2007) . In stark contrast to the first generation, the post-diasporas tend to separate religion and ethnicity, anchoring their identity within the transnational concept of the ummah. This has resulted in a growth of 'home-made' versions of Islam in Europe where sermons, religious literature and public discussions are increasingly in English and where identification can be either with a secularised Islamic position or a fundamentalist approach that demands respect for Islamic traditions in its totality. Some of these young Muslims may turn to essentialist organisations or movements as discussed earlier, but an increasing number are also taking advantage of their tacit knowledge of being both Muslims and engaged citizens of Western societies. In this regard, Cesari (2007) argues that the Westernisation of Islamic post-diasporas has intensified individual choice in Islamic practice which, in turn, has accelerated the pace of transnational Islamic developments. This has happened in at least two ways. Firstly, mass education and mass communication have yielded self-trained religious microintellectuals, who are competing with formally trained imams. Secondly, what Cesari calls 'electronic religiosity' is expanding Islam transnationally through audio and videotapes, independent satellite shows and through the continuing birth of new websites: 'In so doing, they exert a moderating effect on Islamic discourse and break up the monopoly of traditional religious authorities over the management of the sacred' (Cesari 2007, p. 115) . It is within this context that we also see the emergence of a new kind of institutionalised transnational activism among some elements of the post-diaspora generation. The policy dimensions of these political psychological developments are under discussion in the next section.
Muslim minority politics and the reconfigurations of space and place in Europe
How do diasporic politics in a postcolonial Europe condition and make feasible political projects? Over the past decade, global politics and discourses of fear and terror associated with them have affected the relationship among multicultural policies, diaspora politics and policy options throughout Europe. As evident in Britain and Denmark, for example, the decisions by both the Blair Government and the Fogh Rasmussen administration to side with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were clearly mediated by diaspora politics, thereby opening up new locales of strategic involvement and reshaping global maps for citizens of the UK and Denmark. Transnational terrorism has gained particular attention in response to post-September 11, and terrorism legislation throughout Europe has predominantly affected Muslims, often resulting in the criminalisation of a loose range of 'fundamentalists', asylum-seekers and refugees together with a stigmatisation of community networks and community activists. Britain, together with Spain, has been a forceful transnational actor in this regard and has attempted to influence other European member states to adopt draconian legislation on terrorism (Levidow 2007) . For Muslim diaspora communities, this has involved the freezing of property, cash and business accounts as the flow of remittances, including Muslim charities, and financial institutions have come under scrutiny for allegedly supporting jihadi groups in the homelands (Samad and Sen 2007) . Such activities have led human rights organisations to argue that anti-terror legislation is an attack on democracy per se, as few distinctions are made between political activity, community networks, immigration issues and organised violence. In the process, remote acts and routine channels of communication have been the objects of discursive and ideological contestation.
Responding to feelings of ontological insecurity, both majority and minority entrepreneurs of identity in Europe are engaged in ideological struggles to win hearts and minds to their securitised national and religious projects (Kepel 2004, p. 249) . A number of political/religious leaders would like young Muslims to develop a more rigid Islamic identity, rejecting cultural integration and embracing cultural separatism. They point to 'Islamophobia' as evidence of the need to define and strengthen Islamic identity Á to 're-imagine the Ummah' (Mandaville 2001, Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins 2002) . At the same time expressing anti-Muslim sentiments has almost become a legitimate exercise among parts of the majority communities (Modood 2005) . In this sense, Muslims are featured as invaders even in societies, such as Scandinavia, that are marked by an absence of any historical encounter with Muslims. As Bjørgo (1997) has noted, certain Norwegian and Danish right-wing discourses have substituted classical anti-Semitic conspiracy theories with antiIslamic ones. In such discourses, Muslim migrants are viewed as part of a coordinated plan to conquer Europe. Responses to 9/11 and the following attacks have also increased a general feeling among Muslims that they are guilty by association even when being separated in both time and space from the actual attacks.
Breaking free from colonial and cultural heritage and re-introducing the Muslim community in a more productive interaction with European states and society are thus a challenge (Keyman 2007 , Salvatore 2007 . The re-appropriation of religious and political behaviour often challenges existing structures of authority in the majority societies as they tend to unsettle current norms of social cohesion for various groups and institutions (Werbner 2007) . But often they also have a more direct transnational dimension. As noted by Soysal (2000) , when Pakistani immigrants in Britain make demands for the teaching of Islam in state schools, they mobilise around a Muslim identity, but they also appeal to a universalistic language of 'human rights' to justify their claims. Hence, not only do they mobilise to affect the local school authorities, but they also pressure the national government, and take their case to the European Court of Human Rights invoking global rights.
1
These examples, Soysal argues, tend to undermine predominant models of citizenship, which are normatively predicated upon the integrity of national communities and their boundaries. They also call into question analytic distinctions between states and the international system.
A study by Statham et al. (2005) shows how primary religious identifications have had policy consequences in Britain as well as in France and the Netherlands. In these societies more than half the migrant group demands were made using religious forms of identification: 66 per cent in Britain, 53 per cent in France and 60 per cent in the Netherlands. A vast majority of these demands were made by migrants identifying themselves as 'Muslim' or 'Islamic' (Britain 61 per cent, France 51 per cent and the Netherlands 47 per cent). In the British case, 27 public Muslim demands were made between 1992 and 1998. These included claims about subsidies and recognition for Islamic schools, religious education in state schools and anti-discrimination measures. This style of calm and integrated post-diasporic Muslim assertiveness eschews the extremes of isolated radicalisation and angry essentialism. Far from being compliant, it is agonistic and assertive, making claims in the agora of pluralistic struggle, seeking compromises and bargains and advocating a transnational approach of democratic engagement. Within such contexts, it is important to recognise how young European Muslims are providing new discourses on Islam, democracy, civil society and modernity as some of them are increasingly concerned with translating Islam into a universalistic language of human rights and 'personhood' (Soysal 2000 , Cesari 2007 , Werbner 2007 . 'Western Islamic communities have become participants within transnational networks, and Western Muslims have become legitimate members of the Ummah. The ways Western Islam will challenge Muslim world regimes remains to be seen' (Cesari 2007, p. 120) .
In this regard, Ramadan (2004) notes how liberal reformists within Islam are able to reconcile Qur'anic verities and Islamic edicts with a wide range of trends in modern western societies. Ramadan insists that young Muslims in the West take pride in knowing and understanding their religion and in making others in the West pay attention. Muslims as citizens have the right and the duty to make their voices heard and to be full participants in the democratic process. On the basis of core Muslim principles of personal integrity, simplicity, modesty, communitarianism and generosity, Muslims should feel empowered to speak up in public debates over questions of politics, economy and society. As Saeed et al. (1999, p. 824) claim, British-Pakistanis are entitled to contribute to a redefinition of what it means to be British. A self-confident religious-based political identity is a refusal of ethno-racial marginalisation from the majority population and yet also a rejection of mainstream and superficial assimilation into a culture fundamentally in need of re-evaluation. In this regard, the deepest dialogical investments into the origins of one's own religion permit a radical transcendence of both secularism and heteronomous Islam in a process of hybridised engagement. And yet religion does remain a firm refuge for many of those who seek moorings in the wild seas of late-modern relativism. For those who have rejected capitalism, socialism, nationalism and globalisation as programmatic solutions to current ills, religious essentialisms remain as viable and coherent grand narratives.
Western foreign policy has also induced a small but important number of young Muslims to enter the radicalisation phase. The US led war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, the situation in Kashmir and Chechnya, Western support for Israel and the painful pictures of suffering Muslims emerging from the occupied areas in Gaza and the West Bank are trigger events (Precht 2007 , Awan 2008 , O'Duffy 2008 . A relatively recent survey of Muslim students (FOSIS 2005 , see also Awan 2008 found that 83 per cent were unhappy with British foreign policy, principally in Iraq, Israel/ Palestine, Afghanistan and the alliance with the USA. All these areas were viewed by the respondents as those in which Muslims are perceived to be the victims of Western aggression and persecution. Radicalisation often starts with individuals who are frustrated with their lives, society or foreign policy of their governments (Precht 2007 ).
2 Although sometimes described as the rise of militant Islam and the decentralisation of Al-Qaeda, radicalisation appears to be more of a mixture of ideological influences, group dynamics and structural problems in the West. Recent surveys of Muslim opinions in the UK show that up to one-third of the respondents claimed to have more in common with Muslims in other countries than with nonMuslims in England (Mizra et al. 2007) . Within Europe, the UK appears to face the gravest threat of radicalisation processes. According to polls reported in the Financial Times, at least 100,000 people support terrorist attacks in the UK and the scale of the threat is believed to be amplified by the ability of radicals to travel to Pakistan (Fidler 2007) . In addition, joining is not the same as acting to support violence, which in turn is not the same as committing violence. Most of the people joining Muslim diasporic political movements do it as an act of support rather than committing violence themselves. Religion is often used to rationalise violence and it becomes strategic as much as psychological choices to correct their perceived or stated sense of deprivation, grievances or injustice. This can be exemplified by looking closer at the transnational ties linking Britain, especially Bradford and Birmingham, with Mirpur in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir area, in order to illustrate the complex relationship between diaspora politics and foreign policy choices (Sial 2008 ). At least eight major Pakistani religious parties have their network in Britain and operate a number of subsidiary organisations, charities and religious schools and have links with international Islamic groups and charities. Another 150 religious parties, established by the British-Pakistani community, are also active in Britain (Engbersen 2007 , Samad 2007 , Sial 2008 ). In addition, more than 100 NGOs operate in Mirpur and receive more than 90 per cent of their funding from expatriates.
Around 300,000 natives of Mirpur are estimated to be living and working in Britain and in places like Bradford and Birmingham, up to 90 per cent trace their roots to Mirpur. According to research conducted in 2005, 55 per cent of BritishPakistanis were married to first cousins (Sial 2008) . Despite these close transnational linkages, the interviews conducted by PIPS with British-Pakistanis from Mirpur did not display a significant support for jihadi activities. Instead, it found that 64 per cent of the respondents had moderate religious beliefs, while only 16 per cent showed radical tendencies and 20 per cent did not respond. There was, however, a predominant belief even among moderate respondents that a new breed of radical clerics was sowing the seeds of radicalisation among the British-Pakistani youth. At the same time, 96 per cent of those interviewed by PIPS were not affiliated with any jihadi organisation and had never donated money for jihad. What this brief overview of young British-Pakistanis with roots in Mirpur displays is the extent to which the majority of these people are moderate in their religious beliefs and concerned with peaceful solutions to current conflicts in both South Asia and Europe.
Conclusion
Return visits in combination with diaspora politics may work as policy strategies of their own and may as a result change policies at both national and transnational levels. There is a substantial body of research that shows how migrants' transnational activities have the potential to transform the social environment of their home countries (Vertovec 1999 , Sheffer 2003 , Kinnvall 2006 , Brown 2006 . But they do not merely transform policies; more important is how diasporas securitise space and subjectivity through direct actions and as a result of psychological internalised perceptions of territory, home and perceived injustices. By looking at European security from a political psychological perspective, we have opened up the exploration of how subjective understandings of security are informed by policies and larger narratives of inclusion/exclusion, longing and belonging, and home and away. These may be produced at both the state and the societal level, as recognised by security scholars more generally, but they work at the individual and group level and have psychological as well as political effects. Diasporas act and react to the world they believe they have left behind, but they are also likely to be involved in constructing a secure sense of self in relation to their current spatial context as well as in relation to some (real or imagined) ideas about far-away places. This is particularly evident among the Muslim post-diaspora generation. In analysing the sociopsychological forces encountered in the securitisation of Islam, the concept of youth is particularly important. Among the better-established findings of the social psychology of late adolescence in the contemporary West is that these are years of existential anxiety and ontological doubt in which competing claims for belonging and affiliation are most acutely in tension. Focusing on the psychology of adolescence, Arnett (2002) discusses the uncertainty and confusion resulting from global change. As local cultures are challenged and changed as a result of globalisation, some young people find themselves adrift: at home neither in the local context nor in the global situation. They search for alternative answers in mythologised traditions, fundamentalist religions or far-away nationalisms. Hence, the reconfiguration of space and place becomes part of this process of securitising subjectivity in the light of global change, transnational activism and postcolonial politics.
It is not only diasporas that are involved in such processes. Members of majority communities also attempt to securitise space, as is evident in their longing for mythical homogenous societies that never in fact existed in the first place. Discourses describing majority communities as 'indigenous', as 'sons of the soil', as 'true inhabitants' and so on are used to construct imagined communities of the past. Hence, they invoke a sense of security and often superiority in relation to those not only included in such discourses, but also in relation to the space they currently occupy. In the case of the UK, for instance, the 'glorious' past of the colonial British Empire lives on in such discourses, and is reinforced through the reconstruction of 'Britishness' as being tied to a certain territory and specific traditions. Only through serious attempts at desecuritising space and subjectivity, that is by removing structural and psychological fears of the other through a deep transnational multiculturalism that recognises multicultural space and multicultural (hybrid) subjectivities, and by promoting social, economic, political and psychological integration, can these mutual sets of securitisation processes be addressed. By taking their cases outside of the state borders, towards transnational and intergovernmental institutions, young Muslims and other minority communities are challenging state policies through discourses of human rights and personhood. The extent to which such processes will redefine majorityÁminority relations at home are yet to be seen and the struggle between competing ideologies for the 'heart and minds' of both communities are likely to continue in the foreseeable future. However, European security cannot be properly addressed and acted upon unless we take seriously these competing structural and psychological claims for space and subjectivity. Notes 1. In the early 1990s, for instance, when the local authorities refused to permit the opening of another Islamic primary school, the Islamic Foundation in London took the issue to the European Court of Human Rights. Hence, an increasing number of Muslim associations make use of the European level, establishing umbrella organisations to coordinate their activities and pursue a Europewide agenda (Kastoryano 1996 , cf. Soysal 2000 . 2. A radicalisation process is defined as the development of an individual undergoes towards a polarisation of any given viewpoint. Here it refers to a religious radicalisation process, involving an increasing degree of exclusion in the interpretation of religious ideas, thus adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support or facilitate violence and fear to effecting changes in society. Radicalisation as such does not, however, necessarily result in terrorism and the use of violence (see Precht 2007) . 3. Not much detail was provided about this survey and it is probably wise to remain sceptical about the numbers. 
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